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The First Amendment and
Nonpicketing Labor Publicity
Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
the National Labor Relations
Act
Lee Goldman*
Throughout the turbulent labor history of this nation, the pri-
mary economic strike has been considered the union's ultimate
weapon for bringing about recognition, or for forcing an employer to
accede to its collective bargaining demands. Recent events, however,
suggest that, at least with regard to the most bitter labor-management
disputes, the strike weapon may be replaced, or at least substantially
supplemented, by secondary boycott activity."
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I. INTRODUCTION
Labor's increased efforts to induce secondary consumer boy-
cotts2 have drawn into question the constitutionality of restrictions
on labor's power to use picketing and nonpicketing publicity for
this purpose. The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of restrictions on a union's ability to seek consumer support by
picketing' in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, Local 1001
(Safeco),4 holding that Congress, without violating the first amend-
ment, may prohibit a union from picketing any secondary em-
ployer when the effect of the picketing predictably would result in
substantial loss to or ruin of the secondary employer. Neither the
courts nor the National Labor Relations Board (the Board), how-
ever, has addressed directly the constitutionality of restrictions on
nonpicketing labor publicity.5 Rather, they consistently have
avoided deciding the issue,' as illustrated most recently by the Su-
2. A secondary boycott is the application of economic pressure by a union upon a
person with whom the union does not have a dispute (the secondary or neutral party), in
order to induce that person to apply pressure upon a person with whom the union does have
a dispute (the primary or nonneutral party). Economic pressure in the form of appeals to
consumers to withhold patronage is a secondary consumer boycott; union appeals directed
to the secondary's employees seeking a work stoppage is a secondary employee boycott. This
Article considers only secondary consumer boycotts.
3. Picketing typically refers to speech that includes patrolling, the carrying of plac-
ards, and face-to-face confrontation. See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 151 N.L.R.B.
1666, 1669 (1965).
4. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
5. Unless otherwise noted, nonpicketing labor publicity, as used in this Article, refers
to nonpicketing publicity directed against the secondary.
6. See, e.g., Solien v. United Steelworkers, 593 F.2d 82, 88 n.3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
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preme Court's decision in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB."
The reluctance to address the first amendment questions that re-
strictions on nonpicketing labor publicity have raised leaves the
state of the law in doubt and provides little guidance to unions
that increasingly contemplate employing this most effective eco-
nomic weapon. The courts' reluctance is particularly disturbing
since Congress enacted the relevant statutory provision to avoid
unconstitutional restrictions on union speech.8 Thus, a proper stat-
utory analysis should have included consideration of the first
amendment.
This Article attempts to provide the appropriate constitu-
tional analysis of restrictions on nonpicketing labor publicity. Part
II describes the relevant statute and illustrative cases, including
the Supreme Court's DeBartolo decision, that have raised but not
resolved the first amendment issues concerning nonpicketing labor
publicity. The cases focus attention on two restrictions the courts
have imposed on nonpicketing labor publicity-the "producer-dis-
tributor" and the "for the purpose of" requirements. Part III ana-
lyzes the protected status of the nonpicketing labor speech by
comparing nonpicketing labor publicity with labor picketing and
commercial speech-two areas that bear superficial similarity to
nonpicketing labor publicity and that do not receive full first
amendment protection. Demonstrating that the justifications for
restrictions on labor picketing and commercial speech are not ap-
plicable to nonpicketing labor publicity and that nonpicketing la-
bor publicity satisfies traditional first amendment values, this Arti-
cle reasons that nonpicketing labor publicity should trigger full
first amendment protection. Part IV identifies the possible govern-
444 U.S. 828 (1979); Hospital and Serv. Employees Union Local 399 (Delta Air Lines), 263
N.L.R.B. 153, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159 (Sept. 10, 1982); Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades
Council (DeBartolo), 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 705 n.3 (1980), enforced sub nom. Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.Ct. 2926, 2933 (1983);
United Steelworkers (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. 96, 102 n.33 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Pet, Inc. v.
NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1981).
7. 103 S. Ct. 2926, 2933 (BNA) (Sept. 10, 1983).
8. See 105 CONG. REc. 17,720 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLoSuRE AcT OF 1959, at 1388-89 (1959) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; 105 CONG. REc. 17,898-
99 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1432 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 105
CONG. REC. 6233 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1038 (statement of Sen.
Humphrey); 105 CONG. REc. 18,133-34 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1720-21
(statement of Rep. Thompson); see also NLRB v. Servette, 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964) ("The
proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that the unions' freedom to appeal
to the public for support of their case be adequately safeguarded.").
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ment interests in the "for the purpose of" and "producer-distribu-
tor" requirements and shows that because these interests do notjustify the infringements on nonpicketing labor publicity the re-
quirements are unconstitutional. Finally, the Article in Part V con-
cludes by recommending a less restrictive alternative that allows
more, not less, speech and that equally can serve the government's
interest.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Statute
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 9 of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act) governs the limits of a union's ability to induce a secon-
dary boycott10 by prohibiting a labor organization from threaten-
ing, coercing, or restraining "any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce" for the purpose of forcing the
person to "cease doing business with any other person. . . ." Con-
gress, however, in response to the first amendment concerns of its
members11 provided an exception to the prohibition of secondary
boycotts. The exception, known as the publicity proviso, exempts
union appeals to the public when the publicity (1) does not include
picketing; (2) is truthful; (3) is for the purpose of informing the
public that the primary party to the dispute produces a product
that is distributed by the secondary; and (4) does not result in a
work stoppage.1"
The construction and constitutionality of the third element of
the publicity proviso has fostered great controversy and Board and
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). Congress enacted this provision in 1959 as part
of the Landrum-Griffin amendments to the Act.
10. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not restrict labor activity aimed directly against the
primary employer or directly against others sufficiently related to the primary's business to
lose their neutral or secondary status.
11. See sources cited supra note 8.
12. The complete text of the publicity proviso is:
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as
long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by
any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse
to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the estab-
lishment of the employer engaged in such distribution;
National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
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court attention.13 Recent decisions have established that the third
element contains a two-prong requirement that union activity
must satisfy for publicity proviso exemption. First, a producer-dis-
tributor relationship must exist between the union's primary and
secondary targets (the "producer-distributor" requirement). Sec-
ond, the union's publicity must relate solely to the primary dispute
or to the secondary's relationship to the primary dispute (the "for
the purpose of" requirement). This interpretation of the publicity
proviso, in turn, raises the unanswered constitutional question that
is the focus of this Article-whether the first amendment permits
Congress to restrict truthful nonpicketing labor publicity that does
not result in an employee work stoppage solely on the ground that
the labor activity does not satisfy the "producer-distributor" or the
"for the purpose of" requirements.
B. The Cases
1. The "Producer-Distributor" Requirement
The constitutionality of the "producer-distributor" require-
ment arose in United Steelworkers (Pet, Inc.),14 and in Florida
Gulf Coast Building Trades Council (DeBartolo).5 In Pet, Inc.,
the United Steelworkers Union (the Union) had a labor dispute
with Hussmann, a wholly owned subsidiary of Pet, Inc. When the
Union struck and Hussmann hired permanent replacements l" the
Union responded by advertising in newspapers and distributing
handbills in the St. Louis area urging the public to boycott Pet
products and all Pet subsidiaries.1 7 The Union conducted its pub-
licity in an orderly and peaceful manner, did not picket, 8 and
truthfully disclosed that its primary dispute was with Hussmann,
whose connection to Pet the Union accurately indicated.1 9 The
publicity did not cause any work stoppage. 20
Pet filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board
charging that the Union's activity violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
13. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 6.
14. 244 N.L.R.B. 96 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir.
1981).
15. 252 N.L.R.B. 702 (1980), enforced sub nom. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB,
662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983).
16. Solien v. United Steelworkers, 593 F.2d 82, 83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828
(1979). Solien was a related injunction proceeding in federal court. See infra note 25.
17. 244 N.L.R.B. at 99.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 100.
20. Id. at 99.
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the Act and that the publicity proviso did not protect the activity
because the requisite "producer-distributor" relationship between
Pet's subsidiaries and Hussmann did not exist.21 The Union coun-
tered that its conduct did not violate the Act, came within the lan-
guage and purpose of the publicity proviso, and in any event, was
conduct protected by the first amendment.22
The Board ruled in favor of the Union, finding that the requi-
site "producer-distributor" relationship existed because "Huss-
mann applies' capital, enterprise, and service to Pet and its other
subsidiaries" in the form of profits and goodwill.2" The Board
therefore held that regardless of whether the Union's activity vio-
lated the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), the publicity pro-
viso protected the activity.24 Despite specific instructions from the
court of appeals in a related proceeding,25 the Board declined to
address the first amendment issue.2 6
21. Id.
22. Id. at 99-100.
23. Id. at 101.
24. Id. at 100 n.23. The Union asserted that its conduct had not violated the Act be-
cause Pet and its subsidiaries were not neutral secondaries and therefore did not fall within
the Act's protection. The Union also asserted that it had not exercised any restraint or
coercion within the meaning of the Act. One may wonder why the Board did not quickly
dispose of the complaint by finding that Pet, Inc. was not a neutral secondary since it whol-
ly owned Hussman. The neutrality issue, however, is not as simple as it may appear. The
Board has held that divisions of the same company may be neutral; mere potential for con-
trol does not rob a parent of its neutrality. See Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69, 185
N.L.R.B. 303, 304-05 (1970), enforced, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1018 (1972); American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, Washington-Baltimore Local,
185 N.L.R.B. 593 (1970), enforced, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For a general discussion of
the Board's neutrality doctrine, see Siegel, Conglomerates, Subsidiaries, Divisions and the
Secondary Boycott, 9 GA. L. REv. 329 (1975); Comment, The Single Employer Doctrine as
Applied to Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 28 CATH. U. L. REv. 555
(1979); Comment, Unions, Conglomerates, and Secondary Activity Under the NLRA, 129
U. PA. L. REv. 221 (1980).
25. After Pet, Inc. filed its complaint, the Board assumed jurisdiction of the case and
sought an injunction against the Union in federal court pursuant to the National Labor
Relations Act § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l)(1976). The issues presented were identical to those
later argued to the Board. The district court dismissed the Board's petition, finding that the
Union's actions were outside the prohibition section of the Act. See Solien v. United Steel-
workers, 449 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mo. 1978), rev'd, 593 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 828 (1979). The court of appeals reversed, finding reasonable cause to believe that a
violation of the Act had occurred. Without deciding whether an injunction would violate the
Union's first amendment rights, the court of appeals directed the district court to grant an
injunction. The court of appeals called the first amendment claim "not insubstantial" and
directed the Board to consider the claim in the administrative proceeding. 593 F.2d at 88
n.3.
26. 244 N.L.R.B. at 102 n.33.
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed.2 7 According to the
court, the connection between Pet's products and Hussmann was
"highly attenuated," and the Board's finding that Hussmann was a
producer of Pet's products because "Hussman's profits inure to the
benefit of Pet" was "totally at odds with any normal interpretation
of the word 'produce.' ,28 Thus, the court concluded that the pub-
licity proviso did not protect the Union's conduct because Huss-
mann was not a producer of the products of Pet or Pet's subsidiar-
ies and remanded the case to the Board to decide whether the
union activity came within the prohibitions of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The court recognized, but like the Board, declined
to reach the first amendment issue.29
Thus, in Pet, Inc., Hussmann permanently replaced the Union
members who engaged in primary activity and the court enjoined
the Union's attempt through secondary activity to take its appeal
to the public. At present, three courts and the National Labor Re-
lations Board have heard the Union's case, yet the Union still has
not received a decision on, or even a discussion of, its first amend-
ment claims. The most recent case in which the constitutionality of
the "producer-distributor" requirement arose is DeBartolo,"0 which
concerned a primary labor dispute between the respondent Florida
Gulf Coast Building Trades Council, AFL-CIO (the Union), and
High Construction Company (High) over the payment of allegedly
substandard wages and fringe benefits. 1 The H.J. Wilson Com-
pany (Wilson) previously had hired High to build a retail store in a
mall3 2 that the Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. (DeBartolo) managed.
The Union, in support of its primary dispute with High,"3 circu-
lated handbills urging the public not to shop at the mall or patron-
27. Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1981).
28. Id. at 549.
29. Id. at 550.
30. 252 N.L.R.B. 702 (1980), enforced sub noma. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB,
662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983).
31. See id. at 703.
32. See id.
33. The handbill appeal, see infra note 34, might suggest that the Union's primary
dispute was with DeBartolo, not High, and accordingly that the Union's handbilling was
primary and not secondary activity. The Union, however, possibly to avoid potential anti-
trust liability, see, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975),
stipulated that its primary dispute was with High and not with DeBartolo. The charging
party, rather than contest that stipulation, claimed that the handbill was misleading and
untruthful by omitting High's name and focusing on DeBartolo. The Board rejected the
claim, finding that the handbill had not "substantially departed from fact or intended to
deceive." 252 N.L.R.B. at 704 n.2. The Board never questioned the stipulation that the
primary dispute was with High.
14751983]
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ize the stores in the mall until "the mall's owner publicly prom-
ise[d] that all construction at the mall [would] be done using
contractors who [paid] their employees fair wages and fringe bene-
fits." The Union conducted the handbilling peacefully and did
not cause any employee work stoppage.3 5
Before the Board, DeBartolo charged that the Union had vio-
lated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. DeBartolo further asserted
that since DeBartolo and the mall tenants had no relationship to
High, no "producer-distributor" relationship existed and the pub-
licity proviso of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) could not apply.36 The Union
responded that the publicity proviso exempted the Union's activity
from the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and that even if the
proviso did not apply, the first amendment protected the Union's
activity.37 The Board ruled in favor of the Union and dismissed the
complaint. Relying on its decision in Pet, Inc.,3 8 the Board held
34. 252 N.L.R.B. at 703. The complete text of the handbill read:
PLEASE DON'T SHOP AT EAST LAKE SQUARE MALL PLEASE
The FLA. GULF COAST BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO is requesting
that you do not shop at the stores in the East Lake Square Mall because of the Mall
ownership's contribution to substandard wages.
The Wilson's Department Store under construction on these premises is being
built by contractors who pay substandard wages and fringe benefits. In the past, the
Mall's owner, The Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, has supported labor and our local
economy by insuring that the Mall and its stores be built by contractors who pay fair
wages and fringe benefits. Now, however, and for no apparent reason, the Mall owners
have taken a giant step backwards by permitting our standards to be tom down. The
payment of substandard wages not only diminishes the working persons's [sic] ability
to purchase with earned, rather than borrowed, dollars, but it also undercuts the wage
standard of the entire community. Since low construction wages at this time of infla-
tion means [sic] decreased purchasing power, do the owners of East Lake Mall intend
to compensate for the decreased purchasing power of workers of the community by
encouraging the stores in East Lake Mall to cut their prices and lower their profits?
CUT-RATE WAGES ARE NOT FAIR UNLESS MERCHANDISE PRICES ARE
ALSO CUT-RATE.
We ask for your support in our protest against substandard wages. Please do not
patronize the stores in the East Lake Square Mall until the Mall's owner publicly
promises that all construction at the Mall will be done using contractors who pay their
employees fair wages and fringe benefits.
IF YOU MUST ENTER THE MALL TO DO BUSINESS, please express to the
store managers your concern over substandard wages and your support of our efforts.
We are appealing only to the public-the consumer. We are not seeking to induce
any person to cease work or to refuse to make deliveries.
Id.
35. See id. at 703-04.
36. See id. at 704.
37. See id.
38. At the time of the Board's decision in DeBartolo, the Eighth Circuit had not re-
versed the Board's decision in Pet, Inc.
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that "a union could lawfully handbill a neutral employer, urging a
total consumer boycott of that employer, 'so long as the primary
employer has at some stage produced, in the sense of applying cap-
ital, enterprise, or service, a product of the neutral employer.' -19
The Board, employing rather impressive sophistry, found that
High's relationship with DeBartolo and the mall tenants satisfied
the "producer-distributor" requirement as a result of the "mutual
obligations" and "symbiotic" relationship of the parties. 40 The con-
tribution of High (the primary employer and producer) to the mall
enterprise was application of "its labor to a product, i.e., the Wfl-
son's store, from which DeBartolo and its tenants [the secondary
employers and distributors] will derive substantial benefit.' 1  The
Board again did not address the first amendment issue.
On appeal, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit, according
great respect to the expertise of the Board42 and rejecting the anal-
ysis of the Eighth Circuit in Pet, Inc., affirmed. The court clarified
the Board's reasoning by supplying the missing "distributed by"
link of the producer-distributor chain and thus found that a pro-
ducer-distributor relationship existed between the mall tenants
and High.4' The court's clarification, however, made the Board's
construction of the statutory language no less tortuous. Despite
urging by the Board's appellate counsel, by intervenor Florida Gulf
Coast Building Trades Council, and by amicus Building and Con-
struction Trades Department, the Fourth Circuit also declined to
address the first amendment issue."
39. 252 N.L.R.B. at 705.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 662 F.2d at 269.
43. The court summarized the Board's finding.
The Board concluded that High is a producer of the Wilson's store at the mall because,
by its employees' labor, it adds value to the store. High is also a producer of the mall
enterprise itself because, by helping to build the Wilson's store, it has applied capital,
enterprise, and service to the mall enterprise and has thus added value to that enter-
prise. Both the Wilson's store and the mall enterprise itself, therefore, are products of
High's labor.
Although the Board does not elaborate, its reasoning suggests that it considered
DeBartolo and the mall's tenants to be distributors of both of High's products.
DeBartolo and the tenants help "distribute" the new Wilson's store and its inventory
by attracting shoppers, helping to maintain common areas, and participating in joint
advertising. They help "distribute" the mall enterprise and the goods sold through that
enterprise simply by conducting business.
44. See id. at 271 n.6.
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The Supreme Court reversed DeBartolo.45 The Court had lit-
tle trouble with the Board's finding that a person who, at some
stage, adds capital, service, or enterprise to a product is a producer
within the meaning of the Act. The Court, however, faulted the
Board for failing to give even a "fairly possible" meaning to the
"distributed by" language of the publicity proviso. 46 The Court
reasoned that by focusing on the relationship between two secon-
dary employers, DeBartolo and the cotenants, and testing that re-
lationship by a standard so generous that virtually any employer
could satisfy it, the Board effectively had eliminated the "distrib-
uted by" language from the publicity proviso. 47 The Court held
that the secondary parties in DeBartolo did not satisfy the "dis-
tributed by" language because they neither had a business rela-
tionship with nor sold any products whose chain of production
could reasonably be said to include the primary, High.48 The Court
also declined to address the first amendment issue, remanding the
case for the Board to determine whether the Union conduct fell
within the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 49 Thus the consti-
45. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983).
46. Id. at 2933.
47. Id. at 2932. One can make an entirely reasonable argument that Congress, in draft-
ing the "producer-distributor" requirement did not intend to restrict the scope of the pub-
licity proviso with its "distributed by" language. Congress may have chosen such language
as an example since the normal context of a secondary boycott is when the secondary party
distributes the goods of the primary manufacturer. Thus, reading the "distributed by" lan-
guage out of the statute arguably is completely appropriate. See, e.g., Kamer, supra note 1,
at 581-84. Of course such a construction would obviate the need for any constitutional anal-
ysis and was impliedly rejected by the Court.
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2932-33. The Court could have held that the Union appeal did not
satisfy the "producer-distributor" requirement solely because the secondary did not sell any
product whose chain of production included the primary. The Court, by also suggesting that
the existence of a business relationship can satisfy the "producer-distributor" requirement,
left open the possibility that a parent-subsidiary relationship as in Pet, Inc. might fall
within the proviso's coverage. Whether the Court intended the proviso to include within its
coverage parent-subsidiary relationships is unclear.
49. Id. at 2933. The Court cited NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001
(Safeco), 447 U.S. 607 (1980) and NLRB v. Fruit Vegetable Packers Local 706 (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964), suggesting that the appropriate question on remand was
whether the Union advocated a boycott of a "substantial portion" of the secondaries' busi-
ness. 103 S. Ct. at 2933. The DeBartolo handbill, however, clearly presented a Union appeal
for a total boycott.
Two additional arguments that avoid the first amendment issue are available, however,
to establish that the Union's conduct did not violate § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The first argument is
that the Union's message did not "threaten, coerce, or restrain" the secondaries, DeBartolo
and the cotenants, since the secondaries' relationship to the primary, High, was so remote
that even advocacy of a total boycott of the secondaries was not "reasonably calculated" to
induce customers not to patronize the secondaries at all. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employ-
ees Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 614 (1980). The second argument is that the object of the
1478
NONPICKETING LABOR PUBLICITY
tutionality of the "producer-distributor" requirement remains
unaddressed.
2. The "For the Purpose of" Requirement
The question of the constitutionality of the publicity proviso's
"for the purpose of" requirement arose in Hospital and Service
Employees Union Local 399 (Delta Air Lines).e In Delta Air
Lines, the Union had a primary dispute with Statewide, a nonun-
ion contractor that Delta Air Lines hired to perform janitorial ser-
vices. In furtherance of its primary dispute with Statewide, the
Union, in front of Delta's airport and downtown facilities distrib-
uted handbills urging passengers not to fly Delta. 1 One of the
handbills, in addition to publicizing the facts of the labor dispute,
disclosed Delta's flight safety record implying that Delta was
unsafe.52
Delta filed a complaint with the Board charging that the
Union violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and argued that the publicity
proviso did not protect the Union conduct since the conduct was
not solely "for the purpose of" advising the public of the primary
labor dispute. A divided Board agreed with Delta and held that the
handbill, by including information about Delta's flight safety re-
cord, was not "for the purpose of" advising the public of a labor
dispute-only information related solely to the primary dispute
could satisfy that requirement. 5 The Board declined to decide the
constitutionality of this interpretation and took the position that
handbilling was not to force a secondary employer "to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer," 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976), because neither DeBartolo nor the cotenants had any business relation-
ship with or power to control the labor policies of the primary, High, or any substantial
business relationship with or control over the contracting decisions of the initial secondary,
Wilson. The Board by adopting either argument would once again avoid confronting the
first amendment issue. The conflict between the "producer-distributor" requirement and
the first amendment would nevertheless remain, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in
DeBartolo that Congress intended the "producer-distributor" requirement to restrict the
scope of the publicity proviso. See 103 S. Ct. at 2932. The merits of the statutory arguments
are beyond the scope of this Article.
50. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159 (Sept. 10, 1982).
51. See id. at 1160.
52. The Union had distributed a total of four different handbills and republished the
text of two in two Union newspapers. Id. The statutory issues concerning all but the one
handbill discussed in the text are not relevant here.
53. See id. at 1161-62. The Board indicated that it would not prohibit publication of
noncoercive information unrelated to the primary dispute. Id. at 1162 n.11. The publicity
proviso, however, does not exempt such information. The prohibition section simply does
not proscribe the information in the first instance.
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the Board could "presume the constitutionality of the Act ... ab-
sent binding court decisions to the contrary."5
Thus, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), as interpreted by the Board and
the courts, imposes at least two restrictions on truthful nonpicket-
ing labor publicity that does not result in an employee work stop-
page. The secondary must have a specified relationship with the
primary-the "producer-distributor" requirement-and the pub-
licity must relate solely to the primary dispute or the secondary's
relationship to the primary dispute-the "for the purpose of" re-
quirement. Curiously, however, the courts have avoided addressing
the constitutionality of these restrictions on nonpicketing labor
publicity despite the fact that unions increasingly are engaging in
this activity and have presented the Board and courts with the op-
portunity to decide the issue. An appropriate constitutional analy-
sis of the two restrictions on nonpicketing labor publicity as
presented below necessitates a two-prong analysis-focusing first
on the protected status of the speech infringed and second on the
government's justification for the infringement. The analysis dem-
onstrates that the "producer-distributor" and "for the purpose of"
restrictions on nonpicketing labor publicity are unconstitutional.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF NONPICKETING LABOR
PUBLICITY
The first inquiry in analyzing the constitutionality of the "pro-
ducer-distributor" and "for the purpose of" requirements is the ex-
tent to which the first amendment protects nonpicketing labor
publicity.55 To make this determination, the courts may look to the
54. Id. at 1163 (footnote omitted).
55. The question whether nonpicketing labor publicity is entitled to any first amend-
ment protection is not in issue, because it is clear that handbilling and other methods of
peaceful publicity are forms of protected speech, see, e.g., United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct.
1702, 1706 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980); Organization for a Better Aus-
tin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971), and that these forms remain within the area of free
expression when their subject is a labor dispute. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 102 (1940) ("In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information con-
cerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion
that is guaranteed by the Constitution."). Members of the Court, however, have begun to
order the degree of protection afforded different classes of speech. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacific
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746-47 (1978) (indecent speech) (Stevens, J., concurring); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (nonobscene "adult movies") (plu-
rality opinion); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech); see also Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1689
(1983) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3426 (1982)) ("speech
on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and
is entitled to special protection"); Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger
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law of the seemingly related activities of labor picketing and com-
mercial speech. The courts may treat nonpicketing labor publicity
as speech plus conduct similar to labor picketing, or as economi-
cally motivated similar to commercial speech, and therefore rele-
gate the publicity to lesser first amendment protection. A review of
the justifications for judicial restrictions on labor picketing and
commercial speech and a comparison of such speech with nonpick-
eting labor publicity, however, illustrate the inappropriateness of
subjecting nonpicketing labor publicity to similar restrictions.
Nonpicketing labor publicity satisfies traditional first amendment
values and is entitled to full first amendment protection.
A. Labor Picketing vs. Nonpicketing Labor Publicity
The Supreme Court has treated labor picketing with increas-
ing disrespect. The broad pronouncements concerning the impor-
tance of labor speech contained in Thornhill v. Alabama" have
eroded to the point that the Court has upheld restrictions on labor
picketing with the most "cursory" first amendment analysis.57 The
Court has justified its cavalier treatment of labor picketing speech
through the use of two related doctrines-the "speech plus"5 8 and
"unlawful objective" 59 theories. The two theories, however appro-
priate they may be in the picketing context, are not applicable to
Court, 68 CAL. L. REv. 422, 452-53 (1980); Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A
Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265, 282-96 (1981); Stephan, The First Amendment
and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. Rav. 203, 212-14 (1982). The relevant inquiry there-
fore is the extent of protection nonpicketing labor publicity deserves, i.e., whether nonpick-
eting labor publicity is entitled to full first amendment protection. Whether the protection
afforded different categories of speech should be ordered at all is beyond the scope of this
Article.
56. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). See supra note 55.
57. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 616
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring); American Radio As'n v.
Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 229-30 (1974); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local
760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 77 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); id. at 93-94 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289
(1957); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950); International Bhd. of Team-
sters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474 (1950) (plurality opinion); Building Serv. Em-
ployees Int'l Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Stor-
age & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 n.6 (1949) (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers
Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
59. See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616; International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v.
Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. at 293-94; International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 501 v. NLRB, 341
U.S. 694, 705 (1951); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. at 465-66; Building Serv. Employ-
ees Int'l Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. at 539-40; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. at 501.
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1. "Speech Plus" Theory
The "speech plus" theory focuses on the physical component
of labor picketing, arguing that picketing is "something more"
than speech. The "speech plus" aspect of labor picketing thus jus-
tifies additional restrictions on labor speech-restrictions that are
not applicable to other forms of noncommercial speech. "Speech
plus" theorists contend that labor picketing constitutes, at least in
part, conduct designed to coerce and to "induce action of one kind
or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are
being disemminated." 0 According to these theorists, coercion may
take the form of (1) threats of physical harm, (2) threats of eco-
nomic sanctions, (3) unreasoned appeals to class or union loyalties,
or (4) psychological pressure in the form of possible social embar-
rassment."1 Regardless of their merits as applied to labor picketing,
these arguments cannot justify restrictions on nonpicketing labor
publicity because this form of publicity lacks the conduct neces-
sary to effectively coerce the listener-i.e. the consumer.6 2
60. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. at 465 (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers &
Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. at 775-76 (Douglas, J., concurring)). The first amend-
ment does not protect from regulation speech that merely coerces the listener. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941); see also Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 964, 998-1002 (1978).
61. See cases cited supra note 58; see also Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the
Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct, 49 MCH. L. REv. 191, 198-210 (1950); Teller,
Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HAav. L. Ray. 180, 200-02 (1942).
62. Nonpicketing pubicity may attempt to coerce nonlisteners, i.e. secondary employ-
ers. The union, by applying economic pressure to the secondary, hopes to coerce the secon-
dary to pressure the person with whom the union has a primary dispute. The reviewing
body considers this coercion when it determines if there is a statutory violation. A finding of
coercion that satisfies the statutory requirements of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), however, cannot control
the outcome of the first amendment question. Once the court reaches the first amendment
issue, the analysis must focus on the possible coercion of the listener i.e., the consumer. See
Baker, supra note 60, at 998; Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets,
39 VA. L. Rv. 1023, 1047-51 (1953).
Under the first amendment, the government cannot regulate secondary consumer boy-
cotts on the grounds of nonlistener coercion anymore than it can regulate, for example, the
solicitation of voters by special interest groups attempting to "coerce"--lobby-legislators
or the appeals to consumers by civil rights organizations seeking a boycott of stores to "co-
erce" employers to cease engaging in racial discrimination. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982) (The first amendment protects a secondary boycott by civil
rights organizers.). Unless the union coerces the listener, the government must base its regu-
lation solely on the expected result of the uncoerced response of listeners to the union's
message, precisely the kind of content-based restriction that is suspect under the first
amendment. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
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First, nonpicketing labor publicity does not threaten-either
implicitly or explicitly-physical harm or violence. Although ob-
servers at one time may have associated labor picketing with regu-
lar outbursts of violence,6" a similar association never has been pre-
sent with nonpicketing labor publicity." Nonpicketing publicity
neither involves a procession of patrolling bodies that physically
may intimidate consumers nor requires consumers seeking access
to the secondary to contend with stationary crowds.6 5 Many forms
of nonpicketing publicity include no physical presence and, conse-
quently, no face-to-face confrontation that even remotely could
threaten violence.6" Moreover, even if a slight chance of physical
harm existed-for example, from a single overly enthusiastic
handbiller-the appropriate response would be to regulate the of-
fending conduct, not to regulate the speech that only remotely may
produce the conduct.6 7
Second, nonpicketing appeals to consumers to boycott a secon-
dary employer do not threaten economic sanctions. A union-no
matter how powerful-cannot punish or impose sanctions upon a
consumer. The fear of economic sanctions is relevant only when a
union directs its appeal to the employees of the secondary. 8 While
575 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Linmark Assoc., Inc., v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1971); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969); see also, L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTTUtioNAL LAW 580-81 (1978); Cox, The Supreme Court 1979
Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HAiv. L. REv. 1, 33-34
(1980); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HAv. L. Rav. 1482, 1496-1502 (1975); Stone, Restrictions
of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978).
63. See Jones, supra note 62, at 1030; Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First
Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1469, 1490-91 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Peaceful
Picketing].
64. The association of labor picketing to sporadic violence does not suggest that the
government properly may restrict labor picketing because of a perceived potential for physi-
cal intimidation. Not all picketing presents this concern, thus the government's restriction
on all picketing may violate the first amendment. See Cafeteria Employees Union Local 302
v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1943); Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech:
Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YAiL L.J. 938, 952-53 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Labor Picketing]; Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 63, at
1491; see also infra note 140.
65. When disruptive handbillers block public access, the publicity may constitute
picketing. See Service and Maintenance Employees Union Local 399, 136 N.L.R.B. 431
(1962).
66. No one would argue, for example, that a newspaper advertisement physically
abused its reader.
67. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
68. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 445-46 (1970); Cox,
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consumer appeals inadvertently may reach the secondary's em-
ployees, nonpicketing publicity is less likely to induce employees to
engage in a secondary boycott than is consumer picketing. Con-
sumer picketing is more visible and conjures up the historical bat-
tle between management and labor and thus carries much greater
symbolic force than does the distribution of handbills. Moreover,
even if nonpicketing publicity directed at consumers occasionally
induces a secondary employee boycott, the proper first amendment
response is not to prohibit the broad class of nonpicketing public-
ity but rather to treat separately the occasional instances of resul-
tant secondary employee boycotts. 9
Third, while nonpicketing publicity does appeal to consumer
loyalties this without more does not constitute coercion. In many
disputes the union must rely not only on its presentation of its
grievances but also on the public's existing class biases. The union
may seek to convince the public that the union's individual dispute
is part of labor's greater cause. Such appeals, however, are no dif-
ferent than a political candidate's declaration of party affiliation to
garner machine and party support despite possible differences on
individual issues. In short, the government and courts must not
limit first amendment protection to speech that seeks only to
change the listener's mind but must extend protection to speech
that encourages the listener to act on existing beliefs and loyalties.
Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAN. L. REv. 574, 594-95 (1951); Note, The
Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist: Is There a Safe Way to Picket Under the First
Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 177-78 (1974).
69. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. A prohibition of nonpicketing publicity
that results in a work stoppage may have its own constitutional problems. See Note, Labor
Picketing, supra note 64, at 945 n.40 ("the economic effect, actual or intended, of a peaceful
consumer picket has no bearing on whether it is communication and should not be relevant
in determining its level of protection under the First Amendment"). Some obvious differ-
ences exist, however, between nonpicketing publicity that does result in a work stoppage
and publicity that does not produce a stoppage which may justify different constitutional
treatment. When a work stoppage results, it is more likely that the union implicitly or ex-
plicitly threatened economic sanctions or promised benefits (e.g., support in any future work
stoppage by the secondary employees), see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969), and it is more likely that the union had an objective that was illegal or contrary to a
public policy unrelated to the expression (e.g., violation of a no-strike clause). See Note,
Labor Picketing, supra note 64, at 938 n.2. Moreover, the court may presume that the union
intended an employee work stoppage when a consumer appeal results in a work stoppage.
See American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, Inc., 419 U.S. 215, 231-32 (1974) (rational
inferences arising from the effect of picketing may be relevant to a determination of its
purpose). If the union did not have such an intent, the union could request that the secon-
dary employees return to work. The secondary employees probably would honor the union's
request, particularly if the secondary employees knew that the court otherwise would hold
the union liable.
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Finally, while nonpicketing publicity may produce social em-
barrassment"0 and cause some persons to shop elsewhere rather
than suffer some minor discomfort, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that social embarrassment alone cannot justify restrictions
on protected speech.7 1 The purposes of the first amendment would
be undermined severely if speech became unprotected merely be-
cause it caused people to feel uncomfortable. The novel, the radi-
cal, the religious, and the political all may cause discomfort to one
group or another.
Thus, nonpicketing publicity does not contain the same ele-
ments of conduct that the Court has considered sufficient to justify
reduced protection of labor picketing.72 The isolated incidents of
coercion that could arise do not justify restrictions on first amend-
ment rights.
A second argument that "speech plus" adherents might ad-
vance is that nonpicketing publicity is part of an integrated course
of union conduct that is designed to put pressure on the secondary.
This argument would claim that the appeal to boycott transforms
what otherwise would be protected speech into economic conduct
subject to regulation.73 This view has two problems. First, as the
Supreme Court repeatedly has acknowledged, the first amendment
"extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated to ac-
tion. . . . 'Free trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity
to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts."7 4 Second, dis-
tinguishing between information that discloses a secondary's par-
ticipation in or connection with a labor dispute and appeals to con-
sumers to boycott the secondary is not practicable. The former
necessarily implies a request for the latter. Thus, this second justi-
70. To the extent one considers social embarrassment relevant, labor picketing carries
a much greater potential for embarrassment than nonpicketing publicity. Picketing is more
visible, carries greater symbolic force, requires face-to-face confrontation, and generally in-
cludes larger numbers of persons than does nonpicketing publicity.
71. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424 (1982).
72. The Supreme Court in dicta has recognized some of the common sense differences
between labor picketing and nonpicketing publicity. See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. at 618-19
(Stevens, J., concurring); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 311
n.17 (1979); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950).
73. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) ("it has never
been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means
of language ...").
74. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424 (1982) (quoting Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)); see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978); Organi-
zation for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
1983] 1485
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
fication for characterizing nonpicketing publicity as "speech plus"
also fails.
2. "Unlawful Objective" Theory
The "unlawful objective" theory, as originally formulated, de-
nied protection to any picketing whose object or imminent effect
was the violation of a valid state law. 5 The courts, however, soon
expanded the doctrine to preclude from protection picketing whose
purpose was to induce any action that either the legislature'or the
courts judged to be against state or congressional policy.78
The "unlawful objective" doctrine is not applicable to
nonpicketing labor publicity for two reasons. First, the doctrine
evolved from the Court's finding that labor picketing was "speech
plus," which permitted application of a less strict first amendment
analysis.77 While nonpicketing labor publicity may have the same
ultimate objective as secondary labor picketing-that is, to force
the secondary to apply pressure to the primary-nonpicketing la-
bor publicity does not share the necessary "speech plus" elements
upon which the "unlawful objective" theory depends."
Second, a union does not seek an unlawful objective when it
appeals to consumers to boycott a secondary employer. The public
violates no law if it heeds the union's advice and refuses to
purchase from the secondary employer; the secondary employer
does not act illegally if, as a result of the consumer pressure, it
ceases to deal with the primary; and the primary does not violate
the law if in response to such pressure it agrees to the union's de-
mands concerning the terms and conditions of employment.7 9 A
75. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (union pick-
eted in an attempt to obtain agreement from wholesale ice distributor to refuse to sell to
nonunion ice peddlers; the agreement would violate state antitrust statute so the picketing
was not protected under the first amendment).
76. See, e.g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (the Court affirmed an
injunction prohibiting picketing for purpose of inducing employer to hire blacks in propor-
tion to their population in the area because the picketing violated judicial policy against
hiring on the basis of race); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.,
354 U.S. 284, 289-93 (1957) (tracing the evolution of the illegal objective doctrine).
77. See, e.g., American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, Inc., 419 U.S. 215, 229-30
(1974); International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289-93 (1957);
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-66 (1950); Building Serv. Employees Int'l
Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950).
78. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
79. Cox, supra note 62, at 36-37; see Note, Labor Picketing, supra note 64, at 945-46.
But cf. Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975)
(contractor's agreement with union to subcontract only to union subcontractors was subject
to the Federal Antitrust Laws).
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court, nevertheless, could find that the objective of nonpicketing
publicity contravenes a valid law or policy by determining that sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) itself prohibits secondary boycotts. This reason-
ing, however, clearly constitutes bootstrapping and, if valid, would
permit states or Congress to impose by legislation any restriction
on speech simply by declaring invalid the purpose of the speech.80
Thus, neither the "unlawful objective" nor the "speech plus"
theories, by which courts justify restrictions on labor picketing, are
applicable to nonpicketing labor publicity. Accordingly, the labor
picketing cases, although indicative of the Court's unsympathetic
view toward union appeals, are not controlling in determining the
constitutionality of restrictions on nonpicketing publicity.,,
B. Commercial Speech v. Labor Speech
The Supreme Court has manifested its view that labor speech
may be unworthy of full first amendment protection not only by a
differential treatment of labor picketing, but also by making un-
flattering characterizations of labor speech in dicta in commercial
80. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1941); T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 446 (1970). But see NLRB v. Retail Store Employees
Union Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980) (plurality opinion).
The Court in Safeco apparently applied this fallacious reasoning when it upheld the
restrictions on labor picketing contained in § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The plurality opinion held that
the secondary consumer picketing furthered an unlawful objective and therefore was subject
to regulation. The Safeco opinion marked the greatest departure from the early illegal ob-
jective cases and was the first consumer picketing case in which the court found the illegal
objective in the very statute that made the speech illegal.
The plurality opinion in Safeco garnered only four votes and has been sharply criti-
cized. See Cox, supra note 62, at 36-39; Note, Labor Picketing, supra note 64, at 944-46;
Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 63, at 1480-81; Comment, Picketing at the Secondary:
Retail Store and the Right to Publicize, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 405 (1981). No reason supports
the extension of the discredited Safeco reasoning to nonpicketing publicity.
81. The picketing precedents also are inapplicable to nonpicketing publicity because,
while restrictions on picketing leave other channels of communication open, see NLRB v.
Fruit Vegetable Packers Local 706 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 93 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing), a prohibition extending to nonpicketing publicity would cut off the entire message.
Thus, the uniqueness of the medium or the manner of presentation could not justify
reduced first amendment protection of nonpicketing publicity. See also infra note 125. The
Supreme Court often has acknowledged the difference between regulations that leave alter-
nate channels of communication open and those that do not. Compare Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) (time-place-manner regulation of adult movie
theatres valid because those wanting to view adult movies still had access) with Schad v.
Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (absolute ban on one form of adult entertain-
ment unconstitutional). See also International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc.,
456 U.S. 212, 227 (1982); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 n.28 (1978); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67
(1972).
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speech cases."2 The first amendment values underlying labor
speech, particularly nonpicketing publicity, however, indicate such
speech is not analogous to commercial speech and is deserving of
full first amendment protection.
1. The Commercial Speech Analogy
The Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. s reversed the longstanding rule
of Valentine v. Christensen8 4 and extended limited first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech. The Court based its deci-
sion in part upon the similarity between commercial and labor
speech, finding "no satisfactory distinction between the two kinds
of speech. '8 5 The Court explicitly refused to express any views on
the constitutionality of restrictions on labor speech.88 The Court's
inability to distinguish labor and commercial speech coupled with
its characterization of some labor speech as "of an entirely private
and economic character, ' ' 87 however, raises the question whether
labor speech should enjoy any greater first amendment protection
than commercial speech.
The Court's decision four years after Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission" raised further doubts about the protected status
of labor speech. The Court in Central Hudson struck down a regu-
lation that prohibited electric utilities from advertising to promote
the purchase of utility services, characterizing commercial speech
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience."89 As the concurrence warned, this broad
definition-unlike the Court's usual definition of commercial
speech as speech proposing no more than a commercial transac-
tion9 --arguably includes labor speech.9 1 Although labor speech is
82. See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
83. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
84. 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (the first amendment does not protect purely commercial
advertising).
85. 425 U.S. at 763.
86. Id. at 763 n.17.
87. Id. Several later cases draw upon this characterization of labor speech. See, e.g.,
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425-26 (1982); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 364 (1977); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980) (rejecting the
claim that labor picketing deserves more first amendment protection than other picketing
and suggesting the contrary was true).
88. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
89. Id. at 561.
90. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 4961, 4963 (June 24,
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1983] NONPICKETING LABOR PUBLICITY 1489
not related solely to the economic interests of its audience, the
union's economic interests certainly are a motivating factor. The
Central Hudson definition of commercial speech uncomfortably
parallels the Court's characterization of some labor speech as "of
an entirely private and economic character."9 Thus, Central Hud-
son and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy provide precedent for
extending to any form of labor speech no greater first amendment
protection-and perhaps even less-than that afforded commercial
speech.9
3
2. First Amendment Values
An analysis of how commercial' 4 and labor speech satisfy the
values underlying the first amendment-(a) individual self-fulfill-
1983); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
The Court in Central Hudson restated the traditional definition of commercial speech
later in its opinion, 447 U.S. at 562, but whether the Court believes the definitions are
equivalent or prefers one definition is unclear.
91. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579-80 (Stevens, and Brennan, JJ., concurring).
The concurring justices opined that the majority's definition of commercial speech was too
broad because the definition "arguably could include labor speech." Labor speech, according
to the concurrence, should not receive the lesser commercial standard of first amendment
protection, but the maximum protection available under the first amendment. Id.
92. More ominous to Professor Cox was the fact that the Court's decision in Central
Hudson seemed to afford even greater respect to commercial speech than to labor speech.
See Cox, supra note 62, at 36-39; see also Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 64, at 1487.
In Central Hudson, as in Safeco, which the Court decided the same day, the government
proscribed a form of expression appealing to readers or observers because the government
believed that the message would persuade its audience to behave in an undesirable way. Yet
the Court, without providing an explanation for the different treatment, invalidated the
nonlabor regulation in Central Hudson and upheld the labor regulation in Safeco. See Cox,
supra note 62, at 37.
93. Some commentators have suggested that the Court already may have relegated
labor speech to no greater than commercial speech status. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 62, at
39; Note, Labor Picketing, supra note 64, at 959-60.
94. This discussion considers commercial speech to be that speech which does no more
than propose a commercial transaction. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also
Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. Rav. 1, 35
(1976). This Article does not consider the categorization problems here. See Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 4961, 4962-63 (June 24, 1983); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764-65 (1976). But see
Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,
65 VA. L. Rav. 1, 21-24 (1979) (categorization has not been and should not be a problem).
This Article does not examine the values that commercial speech satisfies to analyze the
merits of the Court's decision in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, because that analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally id.; Baker, supra; Farber, Commercial
Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. RPv. 372 (1979); Redish, The First
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
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ment, (b) the advancement of knowledge and discovery of truth,
(c) participation in decisionmaking by all members of society, and
(d) the maintenance of the proper balance between stability and
change95-compels the conclusion that labor speech, particularly
nonpicketing labor speech, deserves greater protection than com-
mercial speech.96
(a) Individual Self-Fulfillment
Professor Emerson argues that "every man ... has the right
to form his own beliefs and opinions" and "to express these beliefs
and opinions .... For expression is an integral part of the devel-
opment of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of
self. '9 7 Thus, this first amendment value fosters individual self-re-
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 720 (1982). Rather, the Article addresses the values satisfied by commer-
cial speech to provide a framework for analysis and comparison of the value of the labor
speech upon which the "producer-distributor" and "for the purpose of" requirements
infringe.
95. Professor Emerson first described the values the accompanying text analyzes and
other noted commentators generally have accepted these values. T. EMERsON, Tim SYSTEM
OF FREE EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970); see also G. GuNrHER, CONSTrrtrONAL LAW 1044 n.3 (9th ed.
1975); Baker, supra note 60, at 990-91. Some scholars emphasize one value over or to the
exclusion of another. See, e.g., A. MIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF Gov-
ERNMENT (1948) (emphasizing the value of political participation, but defining it sufficiently
broadly to encompass other values); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (emphasizing exclusively the decisionmaking value, arguing
that the first amendment extends only to explicitly political speech); BeVier, The First
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 STAN. L. Rav. 299 (1978) (emphasizing only political speech, but accepting extension of
protection to some additional speech for pragmatic and institutional reasons); Jackson &
Jeffries, supra note 94 (emphasizing the value of self-government, although also acknowl-
edging a possible interest in individual self-fulfillment). The Emerson values, however, do
not exclude any important value. Moreover, while some commentators criticize the Emerson
choices as overinclusive, the overinclusiveness may be more apparent than real. Some values
derive from others, see, e.g., Baker, supra note 60, at 991, and Emerson himself recognized
that the four values have meaning only as an integrated set. Emerson, First Amendment
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980); accord Note, supra note
94, at 731 n.80.
96. Indeed, since the courts have subjected restrictions on commercial speech to an
increasingly rigorous first amendment analysis, see infra notes 155 and 156, the courts
should provide full first amendment protection to nonpicketing labor publicity.
97. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GNERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966); see
also Baker, supra note 60, at 995 (the value of self-expression is the most important value
underlying the first amendment).
The Supreme Court also has recognized that the first amendment protects the individ-
ual's interest in self-expression. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978); id.
at 804 (White, J., dissenting); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971).
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alization and self-determination.
Providing first amendment protection to commercial speech
will not promote these goals.98 A seller hawking his wares is not
engaged in an expression of self. The advertisements giving the
price of cigarettes or toilet tissue are not instrumental to the devel-
opment of anyone's personality and do not give the speaker a feel-
ing of self-fulfillment. 9s
Labor speech, by contrast, is an expression of self-of the in-
dividual's frustrations and aspirations. The individual pleading
"Do Not Patronize"-like the person wearing the jacket bearing
the words "Fuck the Draft"'100 or a war protestor chanting "Stop
This War Now"' 0 -is expressing his emotions and views on a sub-
ject of special importance to him. Providing first amendment pro-
tection to such speech "comport[s] with the premise of individual
dignity"'10 2 and channels emotions away from more socially unde-
sirable behavior-e.g. violence-that may undermine the individ-
98. See Baker, supra note 94, at 9-25; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 94, at 14-15. But
see Note, supra note 94, at 744. The form of an advertisement, in some limited cases, may
be an expression of self, e.g., a humorously presented commercial or nouveau poster. The
protection given the commercial message, however, may be separable from that given. the
form of communication. Even if not separable, uniquely expressive advertisements are rare
and their existence only suggests the problems of categorization (i.e. whether particular
speech "does no more than propose a commercial transaction.") While problems of categori-
zation may justify coverage of all commercial speech, see Farber, supra note 94, at 384, the
Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy did not rely on this reasoning, finding instead that
speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction deserves protection for
its own sake. 425 U.S. 748; see Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 94, at 18-20.
99. Without a self-fulfillment interest, an individual's commercial speech, unlike labor
speech, does not deserve first amendment protection unless the speech satisfies other first
amendment values and the speech of other speakers could not satisfy those values. This
follows because only the self-fulfillment value furthers the speaker's first amendment inter-
ests. See Note, supra note 94, at 738.
100. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
101. Baker, supra note 60, at 994. Professor Baker argues that-
[t]o engage voluntarily in a speech act is to engage in self-definition or expression. A
Vietnam war protestor may explain that when she chants "Stop This War Now" at a
demonstration, she does so without any expectation that her speech will affect the con-
tinuance of war or even that it will communicate anything to people in power; rather,
she participates and chants in order to define herself publicly in opposition to the war.
This war protestor provides a dramatic illustration of the importance of this self-ex-
pressive use of speech, independent of any effective communication to others, for self-
fulfillment or self-realization. Generally, any individually chosen, meaningful conduct,
whether public or private, expresses and further defines the actor's nature and contrib-
utes to the actor's self-realization.
Id. (emphasis in original).
102. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see Z. CHAM, supra note 80, at 33
("There is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters
vital to them if life is to be worth living .... ."); see also Cox, supra note 62, at 1.
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ual's self-actualization as well as society's stability."' 3
Labor speech also is connected intimately with the individual's
associational rights. The union member acts as part of a
group-the union-and learns to interact with other members of
that group. He achieves his goals most effectively when he coordi-
nates his efforts with those of his co-workers in an attempt to per-
suade his employer and often the public. Thus, labor speech not
only leads to the development of the individual qua individual, but
also contributes to the individual's growth as a member of the
group and of the larger society.104
(b) Advancement of Knowledge and Discovery of Truth
The second value is essentially a formulation of the classic
"marketplace of ideas" metaphor that litigants and the courts fre-
quently invoke to protect challenged speech.105 As Justice Holmes
explained, "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market
"106
Commercial speech only remotely promotes this value. Com-
mercial speech does not convey ideas, is not a response to the ideas
of another, is not susceptible to opposing argument, and is not con-
ducive to dialogue that will ferret out facts to yield some ultimate
103. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
104. See Baker, supra note 60, at 1033 ("the contribution of associations or assemblies
as the embodiment of people's power to the first amendment values of self-fulfillment or
participation in change should be obvious").
A trade association promoting its product also may include some element of association
rights. Since the individual's message lacks an expression of self, however, the combined
efforts of the group conveying the commercial message make a reduced contribution to the
individual's growth. Moreover, unlike labor speech, a trade association's commercial speech,
although formulated jointly, is rarely communicated to the public through group activity.
Perhaps most important, trade association speech is not representative of commercial
speech. Whereas all labor speech contains an element of association, only a very small por-
tion of commercial speech has that element of joint communication.
105. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,
102 S. Ct. 2799, 2808 (1982); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 n.13, 279 n.19 (1964); see also L. TRmE, supra
note 62, at 576-77. For a criticism of the market place of ideas model, see Baker, supra note
60, at 974-81.
106. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); accord
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980); see also 2 Sz-
LECTr LITERARY AND POLITICAL PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF WOODROW WILsoN 333 (1926),
quoted in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 546 n.1 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); Stone,
supra note 62, at 101-03.
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truth. Commercial speech presents facts and little more.10 7
Some labor speech, like commercial speech, may suffer from a
failure to express ideas. The union member carrying a picket sign
saying no more than "on strike" provides a new fact, but may not
contribute to the marketplace of ideas any more than a classified
advertisement that offers minimum wage.10 8 Most labor speech,
however, provides greater impact on the formation of opinions and
beliefs than an "on strike" sign. In particular, nonpicketing public-
ity typically will provide information and express opinions about
the labor dispute.10 9 In contrast to the use of a picket sign that the
public may have difficulty reading if all the details of the labor
dispute are presented, a handbill or advertisement is circulated
precisely to allow for a more thorough discussion of the facts. 110
Finally, since labor unions most often communicate verbally,
by handbill or by picketing, a representative sharing the expressed
opinion generally is available to respond to questions. The repre-
sentative can indicate the causes of the dispute, the reasons for the
action, and the goals the union seeks. When such information is
107. The claim that the facts conveyed in commercial speech are essential to the
proper working of the economic marketplace, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763, 765 (1976), is not sufficient to satisfy the
second value in the first amendment analysis. The marketplace depends on much more than
just commercial speech. For example, the absence of automotive transportation would crip-
ple delivery systems. Yet the first amendment does not prevent governmental restrictions on
and regulation of motor vehicles. Quite simply, arguments based upon the needs of the mar-
ketplace merely resurrect economic due process "in the ill-fitting garb of the first amend-
ment." Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 94, at 30; see also Note, Labor Picketing, supra note
64, at 957-58. Furthermore, the argument that these commercial facts help to form opinions
about important public issues also falls short of satisfying the second value in the first
amendment analysis. See infra note 114.
108. Both the picketer and the classified advertisement may help to form the opinion
that labor is oppressed. Neither, however, directly makes that argument; instead, the public
must arrive at its own conclusion based on the interaction of the individual's life experience
with the new fact.
109. For an example, see the DeBartolo handbill, supra note 34.
110. The difference in the detail with which labor picketing and nonpicketing public-
ity describe a labor dispute arguably could provide a justification for treating the two forms
of publicity differently. That is, one could attempt to treat labor speech that presents views
or opinions (typically nonpicketing publicity) differently from so-called "signal" labor
speech (presumably picketing), which does not add to the marketplace of ideas, but merely
manifests that a labor dispute exists. This approach, however, presents several problems.
First, determining what constitutes enough information to contribute to the marketplace of
ideas would be a difficult task. Second, when union activity provides few details the message
is less persuasive, proportionately reducing the government interest in suppressing the com-
munication. Last, a detail-based approach does not accord sufficient weight to the contribu-
tion that a picket sign makes to the value of self-expression. Cf. Baker, supra note 60, at 995
(self-expressive speech more fully promotes fundamental first amendment values than does
speech that communicates propositions and attitudes).
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provided, the employer who is the object of the dispute has some-
thing to which he may respond. He may post signs in his store
window, speak to customers personally, or counteradvertise. Labor
publicity therefore permits the dialogue that the marketplace of
ideas model envisions.
(c) Participation in Decisionmaking
The third main function of free expression is to provide for
participation in decisionmaking through a process of open discus-
sion that is available to all members of the community."' This
function has particular significance in the political realm in which
the state makes most of the immediate decisions on its survival,
welfare, and progress, and in which the state has a special incen-
tive and often more effective power to suppress free expression.112
Thus, to many, the most important societal interest that the first
amendment advances is this third value, self-government.1
Commercial speech does not provide information directly rele-
vant to the individual's participation in the political process.11 4
111. See T. EMERSON, supra note 97, at 8-11.
112. See id. at 9.
113. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4437 (Apr. 20, 1983); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3426 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467
(1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 14-15, 39 (1976). Indeed, some commentators argue that the political process principle
should be the only premise employed when construing the limits of the first amendment.
See also supra note 95.
114. "The typical newspaper advertisement or television commercial makes no com-
ment on governmental personnel or policy. It does not marshall information relevant to
political action, nor does it focus public attention on questions of political significance."
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 94, at 15; accord BeVier, supra note 95, at 353-55.
Commercial speech arguably transmits information that contributes to the public's for-
mation of political opinions and thereby indirectly contributes to the individual's participa-
tion in the political process. See Note, supra note 94, at 745; see also Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); id. at 780
n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring). For example, Justice Stewart argued in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy that drug price information might affect a person's views concerning price control
issues, government subsidy proposals, special health care, consumer protection, or tax legis-
lation. Id. at 780 n.8. The ban on drug prices challenged in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,
however, also may help the public form opinions on those same issues and has the identical
political significance. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 94, at 15 n.53. Similarly, an individ-
ual viewing a street fight may conclude that the government should do more to reduce
crime, should make sentencing or parole laws stricter, should reform prisons, or should im-
prove police service. No one, however, would seriously argue that the ban on drug price
information in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy or the street fight were protected speech. In
short, all of life's experiences may affect a person's views concerning some political issues.
Accordingly, a more direct link to the political process than that Justice Stewart postulates
is necessary to trigger first amendment protection for commercial speech.
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Commercial speech also does not further the individual's ability to
participate in the political process. Unlike speech in such fields as
philosophy, logic, or literature, commercial speech neither expands
the limits of the mind nor improves upon the individual's overall
decisionmaking processes. 15
Labor speech also generally makes no comment on govern-
mental personnel or policy and, like commercial speech, often is
economically motivated. Labor speech, however, unlike commercial
speech, does concern political and social choices. The union ap-
peals to the public for support in its particular dispute and in its
larger struggle. 11" The success of the appeal depends upon the pub-
lic's decision to forego what it had perceived as in its economic
self-interest and to support the political and social values the
union represents. 1 7 The meaningfulness of these political and so-
cial choices ultimately rests upon the union's ability to communi-
cate its message. A public deprived of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute is deprived of the ability to participate
knowledgeably in the decisionmaking process." 8 Furthermore, re-
115. Commercial speech, of course, does enable the consumer to engage more ration-
ally in economic decisionmaking. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see
also Redish, supra note 94, at 443-45. The first amendment, however, was not designed to
further strictly economic interests. See supra note 107.
116. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940); Note, Labor Picketing, supra
note 64, at 955.
The Court in Thornhill reasoned that free discussion concerning labor disputes is indis-
pensible to the proper use of governmental processes to shape the destiny of modern indus-
trial society. 310 U.S. at 103. This reasoning arguably suffers from the same defect implicit
in the Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy opinion-the lack of a direct link between the speech
and the political decision. See supra note 114. If the only political decision at issue was a
future electoral decision on the roles of labor and management in industrial relations, the
argument might have merit. A union's message and its act of transmitting it through group
association, however, unlike the commercial advertisement, have more immediate political
and social repercussions. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
117. Moreover, the union members themselves engage in political decisionmaking by
the very practice of bonding together with their fellow workers to voice their concerns on
public issues. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
While the political and social choices the union and the public make do not immedi-
ately register in the voting booth, only the most restrictive definition of political speech
would require electoral significance. See Bork, supra note 95, at 29-35. Judge Bork would
limit first amendment protection to political speech that deals "explicitly, specifically and
directly with politics and government." Id. at 26. Although this interpretation of political
speech would exclude labor speech from first amendment protection, it also would exclude
scientific and literary expression as well. Id. at 28. The Supreme Court never has endorsed
the Bork definition of political speech. See Connick v. Myers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4438 (Apr.
20, 1983); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231-32 (1977).
118. See Carpenters and Joiners Union Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942)
(Black, J., dissenting).
Disputes between one or two unions and one contractor over the merits and justice of
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pression of labor's grievances also might affect the political
processes by undermining the confidence and faith of the public in
the democratic system. Justice Brandeis recognized that "repres-
sion breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies."" 9
(d) Balance Between Stability and Change
The final value the first amendment promotes is a "method of
achieving a more adaptable and at the same time more stable com-
munity, of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus."12 Expression therefore allows
society to avoid the natural tendency toward rigidity on the one
hand and the violent response such rigidity may produce on the
other.1211
Commercial speech does not satisfy this value. Commercial
speech neither calls for nor addresses social, political, or even eco-
nomic change nor allows dissidents to "'let off steam,' 1122 nor con-
stitutes a response to such minority views. Rather, commercial
speech is merely a means by which the speaker seeks to benefit
from the existing economic structure.123 Indeed, observers have ex-
union as opposed to non-union systems of employment are but a part of the nationwide
controversy over the subject. I can see no reason why members of the public should be
deprived of any opportunity to get information which might enable them to use their
influence to tip the scales in favor of the side they think is right.
Id. at 730.
119. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The
need to prevent repression closely parallels the ddfe process requirements of our judicial
system. Both further the individual's self-dignity and the operation of the underlying sys-
tem, whether judicial or political, by maintaining confidence in its equity and fairness. The
Brandeis argument does not apply to commercial speech because this form of speech lacks a
self-expression value and thus repression would not breed hatred.
120. T. EMERSON, supra note 97, at 11; cf. Connick v. Myers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4437
(Apr. 20, 1983) ("The First Amendment 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' ");
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means . . . is a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system.").
121. See T. EMERSON, supra note 97, at 11-12.
122. Id. at 12.
123. Certain businesses will benefit over others through the process of consumers reg-
istering their preferences in the marketplace. This process may result in a gradual change in
our economic institutions. The consequent change, however, is a mere shifting of interests
within a given segment of the existing economic structure, resulting in neither a fundamen-
tal change in the distribution of wealth between existing classes, nor a restructuring of the
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pressed concern that commercial speech may help to rigidify the
prevailing distribution of wealth and economic structure.""
By contrast, advocacy of political and social change is at the
core of labor speech. The essence of the labor movement is the
realignment of individual wealth from one segment of society to
another. The union member appeals to the public to support his
cause in a particular dispute. The union member's plea, however, is
also directed to the public's sentiments towards labor's larger
struggle, which the individual dispute is, in fact, the first step to-
ward resolving. Silencing labor speech not only would impede so-
cial change, but also would risk channeling union frustrations into
more destructive avenues of release. s12 The union will accept more
readily the common judgment when given an opportunity to per-
suade consumers to adopt the union's cause. If, however, the law
permits complete repression of the union's voice, the union may
resort to force, rather than consumers' marketplace votes, to per-
suade the secondary employer. Thus, allowing labor speech strikes
the delicate balance between stability and change.
In summary, neither the labor picketing nor the commercial
speech precedents can justify reduced first amendment protection
of nonpicketing labor publicity. Nonpicketing labor publicity satis-
fies all the values underlying the first amendment and does so
more fully than commercial speech. Indeed, since the Supreme
Court recently has subjected restrictions on commercial speech to
increasingly thorough first amendment analysis, courts should ap-
ply an even more rigorous analysis to restrictions on nonpicketing
labor publicity. Under an appropriate analysis, the "for the pur-
pose of" and "producer-distributor" requirements clearly infringe
fully protected nonpicketing labor speech. The finding that the
"producer-distributor" and "for the purpose of" requirements are
an infringement on fully protected speech, however, does not end
the relevant inquiry.
larger economic system. The fourth value contemplates the balance between stability and
change in these larger institutions. See id. at 11-14.
124. See Baker, supra note 60, at 979-80 and n.59.
125. See T. EMERSON, supra note 97, at 12-13. This justification for protecting labor
speech is particularly strong for nonpicketing publicity. An individual restrained from pick-
eting may have alternate avenues of communication to convey his message, but a prohibi-
tion extended to nonpicketing publicity cuts off an entire message. While other avenues may
be available to pressure the primary employer, the union member nevertheless may feel
frustrated by his inability to make the secondary bear the full responsibility of his relation-
ship to and possible support of-whether by action or inaction-the primary.
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IV. JUSTIFYING THE RESTRICTIONS ON PROTECTED SPEECH
The second stage in the analysis of the constitutionality of the
"producer-distributor" and "for the purpose of" requirements is an
evaluation of the government's justification for infringing upon
nonpicketing labor speech. To regulate fully protected speech 126 on
the basis of its content, the government must show that the regula-
tion is a narrowly tailored means to promote a compelling govern-
ment interest.12 7 The "producer-distributor" and "for the purpose
126. Congress may regulate fully protected speech if the regulation is "a reasonable,
content-neutral, time, place or manner regulation." See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949). The "for the purpose of" and "producer-distributor" requirements, however, pro-
hibit certain messages and consumer appeals at all times, at all places, and in every manner,
see infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text, and, therefore, lack the content neutrality
required of reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516-17 (1981) (plurality opinion); Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
The government also may regulate fully protected speech if the communication is part
speech and part conduct and the regulation promotes an important or substantial govern-
ment interest, is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and imposes incidental
restrictions on first amendment freedoms no greater than is essential to further the govern-
ment's interest. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien
test-whether viewed as limited to expressive conduct or as representing a subcategory of
time, place, and manner regulations-and regardless of the feasibility of separating conduct
from expression, see generally, L. TRIBE, supra note 62, at 599-601; Baker, supra note 60, at
1009-12; Cox, supra note 62, at 48-49; Ely, supra note 62, at 1493-95; Farber, Content Regu-
lation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 743-46 (1980); Red-
ish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113, 148 n.204
(1981)-has no application to the nonpicketing publicity upon which the "for the purpose
of" and the "producer-distributor" requirements infringe. The restrictions resulting from
those requirements are not "unrelated to the suppression of expression." The government's
concern arises from the nonpicketing publicity's communicative impact-the way the public
is expected to respond to the union's message-and is explicitly content-based. See Ely,
supra note 62, at 1497; infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text..
The government also may regulate fully protected speech that occurs in a nonpublic or
special forum. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4436 (Apr. 20, 1983) (office environ-
ment of government employer); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433
U.S. 119 (1977) (prison); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (interior advertising space of mass transit vehi-
cle). This justification for restricting protected speech is not even arguably applicable to the
"for the purpose of" and "producer-distributor" requirements, which apply to publicity con-
ducted through traditional channels of communication that are open to the public. When
labor publicity occurs on private property, an employer nondiscriminatorily may enforce
valid trespass laws, regardless of the "for the purpose of" and "producer-distributor" re-
quirements. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
127. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 4961, 4962 (June 24, 1983);
United States v. Grace, 51 U.S.L.W. 4444, 4446 (Apr. 20, 1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
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of" requirements, however, do not satisfy any of the judicially ap-
proved bases for regulating protected speech. The two restrictions
on nonpicketing labor publicity are content-based and are not the
least restrictive means of achieving a sufficiently compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
A. Content-Based Restrictions
The "for the purpose of" and "producer-distributor" require-
ments most assuredly are content-based. The two restrictions do
not merely regulate labor speech in the context of a statute balanc-
ing labor and management rights 1 2  or present difficult questions
concerning the content-neutrality of subject-matter regulation. 129
Rather, the "for the purpose of" and "producer-distributor" re-
quirements restrict speech that presents a particular point of
view-the union's. Moreover, the restriction is triggered only when
the union's speech has a particular message.130 Even in labor pick-
eting cases members of the Court have recognized that restrictions
on appeals to consumers to boycott a secondary are content-
based. 3 1 A fortiori when the restriction completely cuts off a par-
ticular message, -regardless of whether the communication is speech
only or speech plus conduct the government has regulated on the
basis of content.13 2
786 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963); see also Redish, supra note 126,
at 113; Stone, supra note 62, at 82.
The government subjects certain categories of speech to content regulation on a regular
basis. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libelous speech); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (fighting words). These categories, however, are not exceptions to the general rule
against content-based restrictions on protected speech, but are examples of speech that the
Court has found not worthy of first amendment protection.
128. See Farber, supra note 126, at 736; Stephan, supra note 55, at 204.
129. See generally Farber, supra note 126; Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in
the First Amendment, 43 U. CH. L. REv. 20 (1975); Stone, supra note 62.
130. For example in Pet, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 96, rev'd sub noma. Pet, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.
641 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1981), the Union could have circulated handbills in the same location
requesting that the public not shop at Hussmanns. The Union, however, apparently lost its
first amendment rights by including other Pet subsidiaries in its plea. Similarly, in Delta
Air Lines, 263 N.L.R.B. 153, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159 (Sept. 10, 1982) the Union handbill
would not have violated the Act if it had not included information about Delta's flight
safety record. The inclusion of that specific message caused the Union to lose its protection.
131. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 618
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) ("[W]e have a case in which picketing,
otherwise lawful, is banned only when the picketers express particular views.").
132. See also Ely, supra note 62, at 1498. (A regulation is content-based if the need
for the regulation would disappear when the audience could not read English).
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B. The Government's Interest in the "For The Purpose Of"
Requirement
The acknowledged government interest in enacting the secon-
dary boycott provisions of the Act was to protect neutral employ-
ers and employees from disputes not of their own making.13 The
"for the purpose of" requirement as interpreted by the Board in
Delta Air Lines does not promote that interest. The Board clearly
indicated that it would have found no fault with a Union handbill
without the flight safety information and would have permitted the
Union to enmesh Delta in its primary dispute by requesting cus-
tomers to withhold patronage from Delta. 1 3  Thus, the "for the
purpose of" requirement, as interpreted by Delta Air Lines, will
not protect neutral employers from labor disputes not of their own
making.
A second government interest that arguably justifies the Delta
Air Lines interpretation of the "for the purpose of" requirement is
preventing severe economic harm to the business of an individual
employer. That strictly economic interest, however, does not con-
stitute, in the first amendment context, a substantial-much less
compelling-government interest.
Furthermore, the government's interest in regulating one ac-
tivity is not sufficiently compelling when the government does not
regulate other activity that jeopardizes the same interest.135 The
arguable interest in preventing severe economic harm to an indi-
vidual business suffers from this infirmity. The government fails to
regulate not only some other activity, but all other activity that
produces the same "evil" as the union's publicity.' The decision
133. 93 CONG. REC. 4323 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISToRY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1106 (1948) (Statement of Sen. Taft); see also
DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2926, 2932 (1983); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trade Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951); Service Employees Local 399 (Delta Air Lines), 263
N.L.R.B. No. 153, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159, 1161-62 (Sept. 10, 1982).
134. Service Employees Local 399 (Delta Air Lines), 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 111
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159, 1162 (Sept. 10, 1982).
135. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 520 (1981) (plural-
ity opinion); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 793 (1978); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972).
136. The defect of the "for the purpose" requirement is not simply that too little
speech falls within the prohibition. Rather, by ignoring some speech that is indistinguish-
able from the speech prohibited, the government has undermined the likelihood that a gen-
uine state interest exists for restriction of the prohibited speech. As explained by Justice
White, "The exceptions do not create the infringement, rather the general prohibition does.
But the exceptions to the general prohibition are of great significance in assessing the
strength of the city's interest ...... Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
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in Delta Air Lines would have allowed any person other than a
Union member to publicize the same information contained in the
Union's handbill without incurring liability. For example, Ralph
Nader or even a competing business would not violate the law by
publishing Delta's flight safety record, 13 7 yet the injury to Delta
would be as great as, if not greater than, the injury the Union's
handbilling caused."3 '
A final arguable justification for the "for the purpose of" re-
quirement is that the restriction serves the government interest in
preventing the dissemination of misleading information. The con-
cern is that union publication of information about the secon-
dary-such as Delta's safety record-may present the data mis-
leadingly or lead the public to believe that a primary dispute exists
with the secondary. While the Board's "for the purpose of" re-
quirement may prevent the dissemination of misleading data by
prohibiting all information unrelated to the primary dispute, the
restriction obviously is overbroad. Handbills and advertisements
are memorialized on paper-the government easily can police their
truthfulness on an individual basis. 139 Since "broad prophylactic
rules in the area of free expression are suspect, 1 40 the solution to
520 (1981) (plurality opinion).
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1982). First amendment rights
should not depend solely upon who the speaker is. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 777 (1978). The "for the purpose of" restriction is particularly objectionable be-
cause it makes first amendment rights depend not only on who the speaker is, but also on
whether the speaker is a union member. The restriction therefore also may violate first
amendment associational rights. See Baker, supra note 60, at 1031-35 (first amendment pro-
tects association as well as assembly); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S.
Ct. 3409, 3423 (1982); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
138. When the Union publishes Delta's flight safety record, the public, believing that a
vindictive motive prompted the Union to publish the information, may discount the record's
credibility. See NLRB v. Local Union 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 477
(1953).
139. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978) ("in-person solicita-
tion is not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny," therefore, the government may
justify more easily prophylactic regulation).
140. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
In Ohralik, a commercial speech case, the Court endorsed the use of broad prophylactic
regulations. 436 U.S. at 464. Labor speech, however, is not commercial speech, nor should it
be treated similarly. See supra notes 97-125 and accompanying text. Moreover, the more
demanding inquiry into the government's interest and the precision of its regulation that
the Supreme Court has made in other commercial speech cases indicates that Ohralik may
be limited to its facts. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug. Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983);
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Bel-
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1469
the problem of potentially misleading messages is not to enjoin all
messages as did the Board in Delta Air Lines, but to restrain only
the misleading ones1 41 or perhaps to require greater disclosure.142
Thus, the "for the purpose of" requirement is not narrowly tai-
lored to accomplish any sufficiently compelling government
interest.143
C. The Government's Interest in the "Producer-Distributor"
Requirement
The constitutional validity of the "producer-distributor" re-
quirement also is suspect. The producer-distributor language at-
tempts to further the acknowledged government interest of pro-
tecting neutral parties from labor disputes not of their own
making144 by focusing on the secondary's relationship to the pri-
mary: the more remote the relationship, the more "neutral" the
secondary, and the less the union can justify the publicity. In con-
trast, when the secondary distributes the primary's product, a close
relationship exists between the parties, and the secondary is less
neutral, and a secondary boycott directed against the primary's
product 145 injures the secondary roughly1 46 to the extent the secon-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
141. The Board in Delta Air Lines discussed the possibility that the safety data might
be misleading, but did not rule on that basis. The Board's injunction prohibited all publica-
tion of information unrelated to the primary dispute, not merely nontruthful or misleading
publicity. See 263 N.L.R.B. 996, 111 L.R.R.M. 1159 (BNA) (Sept. 10, 1982). Moreover, the
majority expressly rejected the administrative law judge's finding that the publicity proviso
did not cover the handbill because it contained "misleading unrelated" information. Id. at
998, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1161. Finally, to the extent the handbill misled the public about the
parties to the primary dispute, the Union's appeal probably was less effective and the gov-
ernment's interest not as great. See supra note 138.
142. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
143. The Court's decision in NLRB v. Local Union 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers
(Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), ostensibly supports the constitutionality of the
restriction in Delta Air Lines. In Jefferson Standard, technicians employed by, and in a
labor dispute with a broadcasting company, distributed handbills attacking the quality of
the company's product. The Board and the Supreme Court found that the employer was
justified in terminating the responsible technicians since the disparaging information was
unrelated to the primary dispute. No constitutional issue, however, arose in Jefferson Stan-
dard. The Court did not prohibit the employees from publicizing their message, but merely
found that the employees' activity had no affirmative statutory protection. The case in-
volved state action.
144. See supra note 133.
145. A boycott directed against only the primary's product is a product boycott. A
union's appeal to the consumer to withhold all patronage from the secondary is a total
boycott. A product boycott in some cases may "merge" into a total boycott when the pri-
mary product is inseparable from the secondary's remaining business. See, e.g., Hoffman v.
Cement Masons Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972) (struck product was homes, secon-
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dary benefits from its relationship with the primary. While this fo-
cus on the relationship between the primary and secondary may
appear tailored to the government's interest,1 7 the Board and
courts have interpreted the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
and the producer-distributor language of the publicity proviso in a
manner inconsistent with the government's acknowledged goal.
The Board and courts have not focused properly on the injury to
the secondary vis-a-vis its relationship to the primary; rather, they
have adopted a bifurcated approach when construing section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) that belies the government's acknowledged interest.
The inquiry under the "producer-distributor" requirement is
whether some business relationship or chain of production nexus
exists between the primary and secondary.14 When some minimal
relationship exists, the law permits total boycotts as well as prod-
uct boycotts.149 The law does not attempt to tailor the extent of
permissible injury to the nature of the secondary's relationship
dary employer was real estate developer), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); American Bread
Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969) (struck product was bread, secondary employer
was restaurant owner). When a merger occurs, the Board and the courts have treated the
appeal as one for a total boycott. Id. at 154.
146. Some consumers may withhold all patronage from the secondary even when the
union requests only a product boycott. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 82-83 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). With that exception, how-
ever, the secondary boycott would have no greater effect on the secondary employer than an
effective primary strike.
147. The statute, even if construed literally, still might be insufficiently tailored to the
government's interest. By focusing on the lines of production and distribution existing be-
tween primary and secondary, the proviso ignores other situations in which the secondary's
contributions to the primary are far greater than that of a distributor. But see supra note
48. For example, when the secondary is the parent of the primary but does not have appar-
ent actual control, the Board might consider the parent neutral, even though the parent
company may substantially influence the labor policy of the primary. See supra note 24;
Comment, Unions, Conglomerates, and Secondary Activity Under the NLRA, supra note
24, at 239 ("A conglomerate's power in labor negotiations stems from its size and diversifica-
tion, which give it the ability to 'cross-subsidize between industries and plants and whipsaw
different unions at . . . various facilities-supported by substantially enhanced financial
staying power.' ") (quoting Alexander, Conglomerate Mergers and Collective Bargaining, 24
INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rav. 354, 362 (1971)); see also Comment, Consumer Picketing of Eco-
nomically Interdependent Parties: Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB (Safeco
Title Insurance Co.), 32 STAN. L. Rav. 631, 643 (1980). This criticism, of course, may apply
more strongly to the Board's neutrality definition than to the "producer-distributor"
requirement.
148. See supra note 48.
149. See, e.g., United Steelworkers (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. 96, 101 (1979), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1981); American Fed'n of
Television and Radio Artists Local 55 (Great Western Broadcasting Corp.), 150 N.L.R.B.
467, 470-72 (1964), aff'd sub nom. Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1002 (1966).
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with the primary, and as a result, a secondary employer can incur
injury far beyond that which its relationship with the primary war-
rants. The inquiry, when the publicity proviso is found inapplica-
ble, even more starkly belies a government interest in protecting
secondary parties to the extent of their neutrality. The reviewing
body asks whether the boycott threatens substantial loss or
financial ruin to the secondary, 15 0 protecting the secondary only
when the boycott affects a substantial portion of the secondary's
business. Thus, rather than protecting relatively innocent parties,
the courts have construed the statute to provide more protection
to those secondary distributors who are less neutral.151
The chief problem, however, with the "producer-distributor"
requirement is not its failure to focus on the harm to the secondary
vis-a-vis the extent of its neutrality. Rather, it is that the restric-
tion is not the least restrictive alternative necessary to achieve the
government's goal. The government can achieve its goal equally
well by ensuring that the public learns of the actual relationship
between the secondary and primary employers.
A union is unlikely to conduct a consumer boycott of a secon-
dary that has no business relationship with the primary. The possi-
ble pressure a secondary could apply to the primary would be min-
imal. More importantly, even if informal means of pressure did
exist-through, for example, personal relationships of officers or
directors of the primary and secondary-the secondary likely could
not be persuaded to exercise the pressure through a consumer boy-
cott since the consumer appeal would have little affect on the sec-
ondary if the public was aware of the secondary's neutrality.1 52
On the other hand, if the secondary does have a business rela-
tionship with the primary, the government's interest does not re-
150. See supra note 49.
151. This, of course, assumes the Court has not determined the secondary to be non-
neutral, see supra note 24; see also NLRB v. Business Mach. & Office Appliance Mechanics
Local 459 (Royal Typewriter), 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955) (ally doctrine), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 962 (1956), or otherwise outside the prohibitions of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). See generally
supra note 49. As the Safeco case illustrates, however, the secondary can have a substantial
relationship with the primary without falling within either of these categories.
152. This highlights yet another infirmity with the Act's restrictions on nonpicketing
publicity. The Act by not requiring the charging party to show actual harm to the secondary
or imminent coercion of the primary before the trier issues an injunction thus sweeps within
its scope harmless as well as harmful speech and speech that does not produce a "clear and
present danger" of the feared substantive evil. See Jones, The Right to Picket-Twilight
Zone of the Constitution, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 995, 1020-27 (1954). Since the Act does require
a showing of harm for a damage award, see National Labor Relations Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. §
187 (1976), the problems of proof can not justify their overbreadth.
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quire that the secondary receive full protection from the union's
message since the secondary no longer would be completely neu-
tral. While the interested secondary arguably should not incur in-
jury far beyond its relationship to the primary, here again, the best
judge of the extent of the secondary's neutrality is the public. A
public that is aware of the secondary's relationship can decide
whether the relationship is significant enough to warrant the pres-
sure the union urges.153 Thus, the key to achieving the govern-
ment's interest is full and accurate disclosure of the secondary's
relationship with the primary.
The central failing of both the "producer-distributor" and "for
the purpose of" requirements ultimately is the government's un-
willingness to allow truthful speech for fear that the public may
not perceive its true merit or give it proper weight. Such paternal-
istic regulation cannot meet the exacting scrutiny of the compel-
ling interest standard,154and likely would be infirm even under the
lesser commercial speech standard. 55
153. The collective judgment may distort the individual's judgment-that is, many
consumers may feel that a secondary's limited relationship with the primary justifies limited
withholding of patronage and therefore decide to shop elsewhere, unaware that many other
consumers are doing likewise. The result, of course, would be a reduction in the secondary's
sales beyond that which the individual consumer desired. This "very distant possibility of
harm", however, does not justify infringing first amendment rights. In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 436 (1978).
154. See id. at 432; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see also Redish, supra note 126, at 143; Stone, supra note 62, at 82.
155. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980), the Court announced a four-part analysis for restrictions on commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted gov-
ernmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must de-
termine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
The Court has applied these requirements rigorously, see, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zen's Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and repeatedly has acknowledged that
the government may not suppress commercial speech entirely merely because the govern-
ment fears the misuse of such speech. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9; First
Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 791-92 & n.31; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
The restrictions on nonpicketing labor publicity suffer from precisely that infirmity.
Moreover, even in the case of commercial speech, the preferred solution to potential
harm is more-not less-speech, see infra note 159, the simple expedient that has eluded
the government in its restrictions on nonpicketing publicity. Thus, even under the lesser
protection due commercial speech, which is the minimum protection due nonpicketing labor
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V. A LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
The "producer-distributor" and "for the purpose of" require-
ments are not the least restrictive means to achieve the govern-
ment's goal to ensure that the union's appeals do not unjustly in-
jure secondary employers. 56 The government can achieve its
interest as effectively and less restrictively by more, not less, dis-
closure, a remedy that also accords well with the theoretical under-
pinnings of the first amendment.157 Full disclosure would provide
an informed public that could decide best if and the degree to
which the public should boycott the secondary. Full disclosure
would protect substantially innocent parties without trampling
first amendment rights. The government could place responsibility
for disclosure on either the secondary, the union, or both.
First, the law might require that the secondary employers
themselves provide the additional disclosure of information about
the secondary-to-primary relationship. Secondary employers can
counteradvertise, speak to consumers personally, or display signs
in their company windows. Placing the burden of disclosure on the
secondary alone, however, may be a more attractive than practical
solution. A secondary employer may not know of the union's activ-
ity or what the union's message is until after the union has begun
its appeal. Moreover, counteradvertising may not reach the identi-
cal audience that the union appeal reaches.
speech, see supra notes 96-125 and accompanying text, the "for the purpose of" and "pro-
ducer-distributor" requirements violate the first amendment.
156. Of course, least restrictive analysis can be a "slippery slope" for, as some justices
have recognized, "[a] judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with
something a little less 'drastic' or a little less 'restrictive' in almost any situation, and
thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
279 n.3 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). By the same token, however,
less restrictive alternative analysis requires something more than merely deferring to the
legislative judgment when the alternate regulation is only marginally less effective than the
regulations that restrict first amendment rights. See Ely, supra note 62, at 1486-87; see also
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978).
The Court has often applied a rigorous, less restrictive alternative analysis even in the
commercial context. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 540-41 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). Accordingly, a rigorous analysis is appropriate here, particu-
larly since nonpicketing labor publicity is a traditional mode of communication, see Ely,
supra note 62, at 1488, and since the proposed remedy relies on opening, not closing, the
channels of communication. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982) ("preferred remedy
is more disclosure, rather than less"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
157. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977)
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
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The second and preferred solution is to require the union to
make the disclosure. The Board already treats publicity that does
not sufficiently identify the primary as untruthful.15 A require-
ment that the union disclose additional information to prevent an
appeal from misleading the public would be within the limits of
this precedent.1 9
The union disclosure solution, however, does not resolve the
issue of what constitutes enough disclosure. The current Board
truthfulness requirement prohibits publicity that substantially de-
parts from fact or that is intentionally deceptive,"1 0 but because of
difficult questions of intent, this standard may not suffice to ensure
full disclosure." 1 The Board or the court, however, could engraft
onto the truthfulness requirement a simple burden-shifting proce-
dure to alleviate this problem and still provide the union with
some measure of predictability. For example, the Board could give
the union the burden of asking the secondary employer to provide
158. See, e.g., Local 732, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Servair), 229 N.L.R.B. 392, 392
(1977); Honolulu Typographical Union, No. 37, 167 N.L.R.B. 1030, 1032 (1967), aft'd, Hono-
lulu Typographical Union, No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952, 957-58 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
159. Questions arise whether the proposed disclosure requirements would be found
constitutional. To the extent the omission makes the publicity untruthful, the answer is
simple-untruthful speech is subject to regulation. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53,
67 (1966). Merely because the Board defines misleading speech as untruthful, however, does
not make it so. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, has broadly endorsed disclosure require-
ments at least in the commercial speech context, to prevent misleading, even if not untruth-
ful, messages. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (the remedy in the first instance for
potentially deceptive speech is not necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement of
disclaimers or explanation); see also id. at 200 & n.11; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 570-71 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
792 n.32 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). But see Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 n.11 (1979). The Court has reasoned that the commercial speaker is in
a position to know the truth of his message and has a strong financial motive that would
overcome any chilling effect that requiring disclosure would produce. See Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers,
440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 & n.24 (1976). Whatever the merits of a category-by-category
approach to chilling effects, see Farber, supra note 126, at 759, the Court likely would find
the same arguments applicable to labor speech. The union is a participant in the labor dis-
pute and therefore is likely to know the facts. Moreover, the union's strong motivation to
present its message frequently leads it not only to ignore threats of an injunction, but also
to speak in violation of an injunction. But see T. EMMSON, supra note 95, at 449 (full
protection theory applied to labor publicity would mean that the government could not im-
pose a truthfulness requirement).
160. See DeBartolo, 252 N.L.R.B. at 704 n.2; International Bhd. of Teamsters Local
537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 906 (1961).
161. See supra note 33.
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a disclaimer about its connection to the primary. The union's re-
quest would shift the burden of providing such a disclaimer to the
secondary. The union, exercising its option to include the secon-
dary's disclaimer in its publicity, would raise the potentially ir-
rebuttable presumption that both parties had made sufficient dis-
closure. 162 The presumption would serve as the union's "safe
harbor." The union's choice not to include the secondary's state-
ment in the union publicity would raise a presumption that the
union "intended to deceive." The union could rebut by explaining
why it excluded the disclaimer'63 and by demonstrating that the
message nonetheless was truthful and not misleading.
This remedy, admittedly, may not prevent all harm to a neu-
tral secondary. For example, consumers may not read the union's
entire message yet may respond to the appeal to withhold pa-
tronage. Alternatively, the initial receptors of the union message
may perceive the secondary's true relationship to the primary yet
convey that message incorrectly to others."' The secondary, how-
ever, partially may reduce these harms by counteradvertising. Un-
like the voter in an election, a consumer may recast his economic
vote.16 5 More fundamentally, "the people in our democracy are en-
trusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the rela-
tive merits of conflicting arguments .... [I]f there be any danger
that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments
advanced..., it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the
First Amendment."'' 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Labor increasingly has used the secondary boycott as a
weapon to apply economic pressure upon noncooperating employ-
ers. The secondary boycott raises statutory issues that the Na-
162. Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B.
901, 906 (promptly remedied handbill was evidence that the union did not intend to
deceive).
163. The union might decide to exclude the secondary employer's disclaimer from the
union's handbill because the disclaimer was too long, too costly, or inaccurate.
164. Nonpicketing publicity also may produce certain harms such as violence or re-
stricted access that are unrelated to the union's message. State law, however, provides suffi-
cient remedy for those injuries. See UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S.
266, 274-75 (1956); see also supra note 126.
165. But see Teller, supra note 61, at 201; Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commer-
cial Context, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1191, 1208 (1965).
166. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978); see also Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976);
Stone, supra note 62, at 104.
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tional Labor Relations Board and the courts have analyzed exten-
sively. The courts also have considered the constitutionality of
restrictions on one form of secondary pressure, consumer picket-
ing. The Board and the courts, however, repeatedly have avoided
addressing the constitutionality of restrictions on nonpicketing
forms of secondary consumer pressure. The legitimacy of such re-
strictions remains in doubt.
This Article argues that nonpicketing labor publicity should
receive full first amendment protection. Nonpicketing labor public-
ity shares few of the qualities that have justified the lesser protec-
tion accorded labor picketing. Despite its economic motivation,
nonpicketing labor publicity also is more deserving of full first
amendment protection than commercial speech, an area of speech
in which restrictions have come under increasingly rigorous scru-
tiny. Unlike commercial speech, nonpicketing publicity fully satis-
fies all the traditional values that underlie the First Amendment.
The restrictions that recent Board and court decisions impose
on nonpicketing publicity therefore infringe fully protected speech.
That infringement remains unjustified. The "for the purpose of"
and "producer-distributor" requirements are content-based restric-
tions that are not drawn narrowly to further a compelling govern-
ment interest. By ignoring the simple expedient of requiring more,
not less, speech, the restrictions are likely infirm under the re-
duced commercial speech standard which is the minimum standard
that courts can apply to nonpicketing labor publicity. In an era of
complex economic relationships, the use of secondary consumer
pressure is likely to increase and take novel forms. Accordingly,
the failure of the Board and courts to provide guidance to unions
and their advisors on the constitutional protection due such activ-
ity is most unfortunate. The courts should adopt the analysis that
this Article recommends and remedy their failure to date to pro-
vide this guidance.
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